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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
.AJppellant, 
vs. 
MARION H. CHRISTENSEN and 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1be responderirts in this case, Marion and Rinrtha Chris-
.. 
tensen., are elderly people ·who 1have been in the farmmg 
and sheep-m.ising business at their property in American 
Fork, Utah, since before 1930. 'Uhey have specializ~ ·in 
maintairu.ng 400 -450 head o.f sheep for the last ten y~ 
on their set-up consisting of over. 27 acres of hay_, ~' 
corn and pasture on their faml, together wilth 1~34 acres 
oonta.ining a ·home, granary, four sheds and pasture lo-
cated ·in the south part of American Fbrk CiJty, three-
~ of a mile north of the fann acreage. The year-
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2 
round sheep operation was operated solely by respondents 
and they utilized fue protective. ·lambing sheds (ronverted 
chicken ·coops) with pasture on their home property to early-
lamb 150-175 ewes at a time. in Mareh and April of each 
year to obtain favorable marketing conditions. They also 
used rthe sheds and pasture with availaJble electricity Wld 
water to shear and dock the sheep in the spring. . After 
the herd was taken to range in June, the ten valuable rams 
of respondents were kept on the home pasture the ·balance 
of the year. Respondents could ·conveniently trail the sheep 
back and forth the three-fourths mile between the farm 
and the home ··set:-up by using a rear entrance and gate 
which they had used for over twenty-five years (Tr. 16-28, 
47-52, 69, 152-156, 197). 
Responden~ts used their truck to put feed in the man-
gers for the sheep they were caring for in the pasture at 
the home property. Without the pasture to feed and graze 
the 175 1head.of.Jambing ewes·and·to,shear the sheep, they 
could nat use the sheds on tJhe property. The State of Utah 
condemned practically all of the pasture, leaving oniy the 
buildings, and made it impossible to accommodate any large 
number of sheep for tending and care on the home prop-
erty and the condemnation cut off the access trail. to the 
south, makmg it unfeasible to drive the sheep around the 
underpasses to travel between the farm and the home prop-
erty. Ua.ck O!f feed and room made it impossible to pas-
ture tJhe ten buck ~ams at all. No other pasture grounds 
north of the .fireeway were avail,able rto respondents for util-
izing fueir sheds and facilities on their 1home loca:tion <Tr· 
20, 28, 43, 48, 156-160). 
On damag~, .fuere was a wide variance ~garding. sev-
erance between the ·witnesses for the owners ( responde.nJb;) 
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and witnesses for the State. The ~vidence in behalf of re-
spondents showed that usefulness and value of the ·sheds 
and buildings remaining (not movable nor sa.lvagable) had 
been destroyed by the taking of the pasture ground and 
the proximity of the highway had damaged the house with 
the attendant factors o[ traffic noise, dust, dirt, headlights, 
etc. The grade of the road was five feet higher than the 
ground surlace in back of respondents' house and the road 
ascended 25 feet higher two blocks east rand west Otf said 
house to go over the underpasses (Tr. 9-11, 73-83, 90-94, 
121-126). The witneSses for the State both testified there 
wa:s no damage to the remaining land and buildings ex-
cept for trivial amounts of $420.00 (Harding) for leaving 
the property unsquare (Tr. 180) or of $620.00 (Stein) for 
reducing the size of the building lort (Tr. 219). 
A swnmary of the evidence of respondents and . their 
expert witnesses on values and damages entitled to com-
pensation from rthe State of Utah, :Collows, to-wit: 
Marion and Rintha Chrisfunsen (Tr. 39-40, 164) : 
(1) .54 acre taken. . . . . . . . . . . . $1,350.00 
(2) Damages to ·home, sheds, 
buildings and remainder land $6,932.00 
(3) Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,282.00 
Denzil A. Brown (Tr. 57-58): 
(1) .54 acre 1Rken..... . . . . . . . $1,080.00 · 
(2) Damages to ·home, ; sheds, 
buildings and remainder ~and $5,694.48 
(3) Total damage . . . . .. . . . . . . . . $6,774.48 
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Milton Harrison (Tr. 90-91) : 
( 1) '54 . ' ' . . ' ; . 
· · . acre taken . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,080.00 
. . 
(2) Damages to home, sl)eds, 
:builduigs and renuldri<Ier'Iand $5,940.00 
(3) Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7,020.00 
Afton Payne (Tr. 121, 125-126): 
(1) .54 acre taken . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,080.00 
(2) Damages to home, sheds, 
buildings and remainder land $5,698.50 
(3) Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . $6,778.50 
The jury viewed the premises (Tr. 15) before the ta.k-
·in.g of evidence from the witnesses, but no complaint was 
made by . appellant of any irregularities with the jury at 
the view until aft~ the verdict was rendered and appellant 
filed a motion for a new trial (R. 78) . The affidavit (filed 
after trial) of the Federal road employee, Faxon (R. 83-84) 
shows on its face that Attorney Aldrich for the State of 
Utah was present and participated prior to the trial at the 
jury view in the conversations alleged to have been im-
proper. A coqnter-affidavit by said respondent Rintha 
Ohristeriseri (R. 24-26), among other things, categorically 
denies' she ever addressed the jury at large and denies the 
Affidavit of said Glen S. Faxon, Jr. The Court after the 
view (Tr. 16) a.dmonished the jury: "You are instructed 
again that anything you,may have heard anyone say rela-
tive t:o the property;· eith~ by attorneys or :the-'Ba:iliff or 
. . 
~anyon~· ·e,lse, you are not ·to consider as evidence in the 
case.,,.-:.· The trlal tnen ·prbeeeded." 
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The zoning question regarding respondents' property 
Presents no problem because all of the wi1nesses testified 
it was zoned agricultuml - residential art the time of con-
demnation and that ·this allowed the continuing usage for 
sheep operations as conducted by respondents in the past 
and rthat this was the highest and ·best use of rthe property 
(~. 45-46, 73, 83, 95-96, 110, 132-138, 153, 1 ~~-174,. 219, 
231) .. ~on Oh.ristensen testified he could not raise poul-
t~ there no~ (at time of trial) becaJUse he hw;ln'rt raised 
them there for past two years and 1hrus were zoned out 
(Tr. 27). The 'State was -not. prevented from presenting 
. . 
~der:t~ of ~g as both Olf._the State's witnesses, Harding 
and Stein, did testify that the property could be .. ~ f<?r 
poultry raising at date of condem.nation (Tr. 177, 219-220). 
The State, by counsel, .said ·they wanted rijle knowledge of 
their witness and ·not the ·American· Fork ordinances as 
evidenre, ·though Harding admitted on voir dire he had ·the 
ordinances and would. produce $em .. · 'Tihe State failed to 
produce the ordinances and yet· had their witness explain 
the zoning regulation ('IT. 17 4-175) . 
J • 
The State even had responden/ts' witness, Denzil Brown, 
testify on ~examination . that .. the sheep ·usage of rthe 
property ·had become non-conrfomrlng (though permitted) 
by asking whether if this use were ever discontinued for 
a period of time, could it thereaf.ter be used for sheep pro-
duction (Tr. 73) .. · 
The Court, in its Instlru.ction No. 7 to the jury (Tr. 
272, R. 61), indicated that damage to the remaming land 
and the use to whiCh said remainder was being~ put_ ~ re-
Wdents were elements t0 be considered m fixing the ~ .. 
~; if auy. -'Ibis instruction was not considered injurious 
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by appellant as it was not Urg~ as error in its- Motion for 
Remittitur, and/<»:- Motion for New Trial (R. ~76--19) nor 
in the Notice of Appeal setting forth the "matters and points 
of error" (R. 87~88). 
'I'he trial judge considered the arguments and written 
briefs filed by the parties in the matter of the appellant's 
Mortion for R·emission of Verdict by Remittitur, and in the 
Alternative, a Motion for New Trial, and duly refused any 
remission· of the·amount of the verdict, denied said Motions 
and upheld the jury verdict assessing the defendants' com-
pensation and damages, which verdict was based on the 
great weight of evidence ~and within the issues ·of the case 
as follows: 
(1) Fair market value of .54 acre 
of land as of January 18, 
1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,080.00 
- (2) Damages ·~ to the de-
fendanrts' remaining property 
not taken by reason of its 
severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,-420.00 
(3) TOTAL VERDICT 
(R. 72-73, 75, 82, 85-86) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
$5,500.00 
THE VIEW BY THE JURY OF -THE C!ONDEMNED 
PREMISES DID NOT PREVENT THE STATE OF UTAH 
FROM OBTAINING' A FAIR. AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE 0'F UTAH WAS NOT· DENIED. A FAIR 
AND_ IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY QUESTIONS ASKED ON 
CROSS EXAlVIINATION O·F STATE'S WITNESS WIL· 
BUR HARDING. 
POINT ill 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO RE-
CEIVE EVIDE.NCE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, APPELLANT, RELATING TO ZO·NING RBSTRIC-
TIO'NS ON THE SUBJECT PRO,PERTY. 
POINT IV 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FO~URTH DIS-
TRICT CO·URT WAS NOT AN INC01RRECT ·sTATE-




THE VIEW BY THE JURY OF THE CONDEMNED 
PREMISES DID NOT PREVENT THE STATE OF UTAH 
FROM OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
The State of Urtah requested the view m the ~premises 
by the jury before the chief evidence .Jhad been presented 
in fue case (Tr. 13-15). After the view the ·court admon-
ished the jury at the beginning of the presentation of the 
eviden~ (Tr.. 16) as follows: · .. 
''You are instructed· again that anyt~g ·you m~y 
have heard anyone say relative to rthe property, eithe~ 
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by ·attorneys ·ar the Bailiff or ·anyooe else, you are ~oi 
to consider as evidence in the c8se.'' 
The State Of. Utah made no recoJ;d at any time __ dur::-
ing the progress of the trial of ariy. uTegularirties allegedly 
occurring at the jury viewing of the premises, but did com-
pl.ain after the jury verdict was received through an affi-
davit (R. 83-84) by a Federal Bureau of Roads employee, 
Glen E. Faxon, setting forth alleged irregularities of which 
Attorney Aldrich for the State of Utah 'had full knowledge 
art the said jury viewing of ·1Jhe premises. No motion to 
impanel a new jury or declare a mistrial was ever made 
by anyone in this case. 
If nothing else occurred, the State should be deemro 
to have waived its right to a mistrial, if any, by not tak-
ing timely objection to alleged irregularities or not mov-
ing for a new jury or for a mistrial. 
However, the said affidavit by Faxon, alleging mis-
conduct was controverted and denied by an affidavit of 
respondent, Rintha Christensen (R. 24-26), which also sets 
forth certain irregular conduct of appellant's Attorney 
Aldrich in personally pointing out to the jury and showing 
the jury the premises before respondents appeared on the 
premises with their attorneys. If the ~parties proceeded 
to trial and knowingly submit the case to the jury after 
such view, they both should be bound by the jury verd~ct 
and could .not be heard t9 complain thereafter, especially 
aft~ the wa.rnmg and instruction by the court _to the jury 
t~ .. :disregard anything .. they _heard anyone. 8?:~ . relative to 
''>:n·,:. ..:·." ,· . • ... · . , . .. ... . . . .. . 
tlie .. Property at the yt:e:w. , . · . , ._ 
l..·-~· .. ;, .~· ... '. .. ' . ·- . ' '.. .. ... ' .• '· .. -
· Respondents deny any prejudicial ~u~l but see 
annotation 45 ALR 2nd 1124, 1130, setting 'forth cases that 
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p~JudiciaJ misconduct at a. jtuy view may be waived by 
failure of tJhe losing side to make a timely objection; or 
that misconduct may be corTected · by an instruction from 
the Court to disregard anything the jury may have learned 
as a result of such misconduct:; or that misconduct by both 
sides offsets each other. 
The discretion of the trial judge (who knew all 11he 
conditions of the jury view) in not granting the State of 
U·~ any relief upon the basis of such alleged irregulari-
ties should be upheld. The question was argued and briefed 
for the lower Court by the parties prior to the denial of 
the appellant's Motion for a New Trial after the verdict had 
been entered (R. 76-86). In addition, the substantive mat-
ters alleged by said Faxon to 'have been said by Rinrtha 
Ohl"istensen were not prejudicial. Aptlellanrt eompladns only_ 
that it was prejudiced by the presence of said respondent 
and that she had to be cautioned hy State's attorney. 'f.hls, 
the appellant never complained aJbout. nntil after the trial, 
wl)ile knowing all the facts dwing the progress of rthe trial. 
Appellant didn't even cross-examine Mrs. Christensen on 
'her testimony which set out all the facts allegedly started 
by ,her improperly at the view (R. 165). 
There was no issue ·whatever in the case respecting 
loss of profits as mentioned on P. 12 of appellant's brief. 
Rather, respondents contended (and fue jury agreed) thart 
the evidence showed the usefulness and value of the sheds 
and buildings for accommodating iarge nwnbers of sheep 
·had been destroyed by appropriating virtually· a11· of· the 
pasture and leaving only the buildings (Tr. 20-21, 124-125~ 
and States' Emilbit No. 1)·. 
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Hayward v.· Richardsoh· C~ctioo Co .. <Mont.l959) 
347 · P.· 2nd 475, holds that a losirig party must ~btain ~~ 
adveme ruling from the court regaTdmg IDJ.proper matter 
going before the jury, before ·he Is in a position to contend 
On appeal that trial court oommitted error; and also that 
where there has been misconduct in the trial without an 
opportunity to object in advance, the aggrieved party may 
move the court for a mistrial or venire de novo, Hnd fail-
ing .in that, he will he deemed to ~have taken his chances 
with the jury. 
POINT ll 
THE STATE OF UTAH WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY QUESTIONS ASKED ON 
CROSS EXAMINATIO·N OF STATE'S WITNESS WIL-
BUR HARDING. 
At the outset, it should be lUlderstood that the ques-
tions complained of (not the answers) were asked of ap-
pellant's expert witness, Wilbur Harding, upon cross-exam-
ination by counsel for respondents. Also, be it remem-
bered that Mr. Harding was not an ordinary witness, but 
an expert hired and paid by appellant to make appraisals 
and be a professional wi1ness for the State of Utah High-
way Department as a part of his busin.ess.. 
The case of State v. Peek, 1 U. 2nd 263, 265 P. 2nd 
630, holds 1that ''as .long as cross-examination tends to <1&. 
close the truth, it should never be curtailed or. limited." 
In. an eXtensive opinion in the Peek case, this court jus-
tifies .the .wi<;Ie. latitude allowed for cross-examination,,~· 
pecl··ally of ·value wi~tnesses and opini,Qn witnesses. t~ sh~·. 
their familiarity or lack of familiarity with the ... value ·of 
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sim~ar .property. The opinion notes that value on similar 
prope~ may be inquire<I . into on cross-examjnation even 
in jurisdictions which exclude such evidence on direct ex-
amination. Such cross-examination may include the de-
tails of such sales and the items used by the witness in 
arriving at his valuation. Quoting from 5 Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain, 183, Sec. 18.45 (2), the opinion states the 
following: 
"The scope of th·e cross-examination of experts 
and other witnesses who have testified to value in land 
damage cases is very broad, since cross-examination 
is often the only p:rortecti.on of the opposing party 
against the unwarranted estimates that a certain class 
of mercenary experts is wont to indulge in . . . . . . . 
A witness who has . given an opinion of value may, 
however, in the discretion of the eourt, be asked ques-
tions on ·cross-examination, for the purpose of testing 
his opinion, which would he improper upon <:Iirect ex-
amination . . . . . 
''The opinion of a witness may be impeached by 
showing that his acts are inconsistent witll his words, 
as for example by showing that ~he has offered tile 
same or similar property for sale at a price far differ-
ent from what he now says it is worth, or he may 
be asked whether ~he has not made inconsistent state-
ments upon the same point upon other occasions.'' 
In the cross-examination of the ''e~'' WUbur Har-
ding that appellant complains of (Tr. 200-201) irt was 
brought out that said Harding had in fact appraised the 
adjacent similar ·property for the State m Utah, but-~ 
spondents were not allowed to inquire upon cross--exam-
ination. what, if anything, the expert had previously ·al.-
lowed in his opinion or appraisal for proximity of the high-
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12 
way next to the property in qUestion. ·eertainly respond-
ent should be able· to test the credibility of such a ~tll~ 
or impeach ·hiin ·if he has been ilicorisi.Stent or taken ·a 
different position than he is now testifying to before the 
jury. Harding had previously testified .that there was no 
proximity damage because of the condemnation and con-
struction· of the highway and that his total severance dam-
age value of $420.00 was allowed because the back of the 
lot was irregular in shape rather than squared (Tr. 178-
180). He ·also testified that the land and buildings could 
be utilized for the same purposes as before the taking Of 
the .54 acre pasture; that there was no noise damage from 
proximity of the highway because of the location of the 
property in an area not the most desirable and that sales 
in the area since the construction of the highway were for 
their former prices without any depreciation because of 
th·e highway. He testified of residential values in the area 
of $2,000.00 per acre and comparables in the area at $2,000.-
00 per acre for the highest and best use to which he coUld 
put the property. He also gave sale prices for contiguous 
property abutting the highway facility after it was lmown 
that the highway was to be built and also after it was in 
factcorripleted and that said properties sold (in.his opinion) 
for tile same thing that they would have sold for had the 
highway· not been put in (which accounted for the ·adja-
cent prope·rties. to the east and to the south of .the prop-
erty in question) though the::;buyer was nQt stated except 
to say part of one pareel .was taken by the State Qf_.l.]tah 
(T:f;, 185-187).. · ~-.,·~~ .: ,.: .. ··.· .. · 
. ·en 'c~s~exairii~ati6n·,. :Harding.· admitted .. he <differed 
·~ f· ,I --\'· • ~' 1 • • : ! t i I " · . . l , • , • · ,• • _, .,. __ • . ,.. ~ ; • : . Ill ~ , ." from reSIXmdent~'· appr~ise;s> ~fi··severan~ ahd'.'ihat~·:he did 
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not get any information from respondents or go through 
·their home to make his appraisal (Tr. 188-191). Also he 
admitted he didn't know respondents owned additional prop-
erty and two sheds than he first thought when he made 
his appraisal before the condenmation, which appraisal was 
unchanged at trial permitting only the $420.00 severance 
for iiTegu}ar shape otf the lot; that 1he knew respondents 
were in the sheep business :having unknown numbers of 
sheep operated on a split operation between home and farm 
properties: that the highest and best use of the property 
was what it was being used for and rt:lhat there was ·traffic 
use out of the south end of the property past the ice plant 
to the south; ~that he was not in the sheep business 'but 
knew some about sheep but ·no experience with large nwn-
bers of sheep; that he did not know the number of trucks 
that will pass this property when six lanes opened up, but 
had an opinion regarding the effect of lights, noise ~d 
fumes from diesels on the remaining property (Tr. 191-
199). 
The jury ·had ·been to the property to see how it lay 
with respect to the surrounding area. HJarding had testi-
fied of the values of the properties to ·the east and to the 
south of the subject property and respondents had a right 
to inql.lire into 1his knowledge of the disposition of the ad-
jacent property to the west that was similarly situated \Vith 
respect to the proximity of and severance by the ~highway, 
For testing the credibility of the witness, Harding, who 
says there is no proximity damage in this case, cannot re-
spondents examine his reasons and values given for .land 
similarly situated of which he had knowledge and experi· 
ence, ·but which he pointedl.v omitted from 'his direct tesfi ... 
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mony -in·. ·explaining the values· ··of the·· surrounding. p~r­
ties,. p~t of ·which were taken for the same h1g~hway pr~j-
. rot? . I , ' '':· ·., - J . • \ . , .. ? , 
,.• 
· One· of the -primary issues of this case ·was .. whether 
or' 'not there·w~s· proxi~ity .damage to this prope~ caused 
by ·oonstruction _of the ~ghway. A~l the ~vidence _up to 
the time Mr. Harding Wel$ ~om t9 tell the_tJ;uth was that 
there ~as proximity. damage., but Mr. H~~ said,.·there 
· wa.S not. Would the r~asons given by Harding to ~xplain 
why he prEMously allowed proximity for the property next 
. ' 
door west as ~ed to why he did not ~ a:Dow for the 
Property in question be improper? They could certainlY 
be explained and differentiated on these ~ide by sid~ a~­
praisals and 1Jhis would go to the weight of the _evidence 
and not that it was inadmissible or improper. How could 
the appellant know what the answers of the witness were 
gOing to be ·before he answered? The answer is that ap-
pellant must have known the witness was going to discredit 
himself or be embarrassed if he answered. 
However, the witness did not answer anything- damag-
ing e~cept that he did not ,know: It ·should be ·rioted that 
the observation: by Attorney Aldrich was not an objection 
. but an observation· ·which the lower court 'nee<f not make 
a :hrling upOn. · The· court had previotisly warned Mr. AI-
.·. ·drich that he· coold ·rule only- on objections ·and inoti<mS, 
not ·observations (.Tr. 18-19). -
The: ~Ount 'stated of $3500.00 in -fu~:._rqu~On was 
~uch 1e&s·· ·than· the testimony· Oi ·~ndentS' ·with~ .. fur 
tli~ · ~Ollrlt Oi· se~erance d~age in· ilie · ihstant ·~e- and 
tli~ ~d not', be pr~jo.qicial:' 'as far as the ~jilrY ~~-con-
. ·, .· '. ... . ' . ,..... .· . . . -
. ~etl·. · :However,· Counsel for ·~P<>iidents were· uriaJble t0 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




get any information. froll'l: .. ~- Harding on the question as 
ne ~(l ~at: answer and tl;l.e trial 'judge sustained the.·._Qbjec-
. . . -. - ) 
tions to .furt}1er question_s. .. · 
in· view of th~ direct· evidence· about value of adjacent 
properties, we think that we were entitled to elicit from 
Harding whether there W:as proximity damage he allowed 
to the west property resulting from the location of the high~ 
~ay across the south side of both properties. It is every-
day practice to ask leading questions of an adverse witness 
on cross-examination and to show previous in,consistent or 
contradictory opinions of an expert witness. 
The court noted himself that no harm had been done 
on page 201 orf the transcript where he observed he had sus-
tained appellant's objections and that the witness had not 
answered the line of questions objected to. If the dam-
age of this questioning was so prejudicial, why did not 
counsel ask for a mistrial or other relief out of the hear-
ing of the jury? No motion for any relief was ever made 
by appellant except upon Motion for Remittitur and for 
New Trial, after the verdict which the trial j-udge, in his 
discretion, denied and .upheld the full jury award whi~ch was 
based on the great weight orf the evidence. Obviously, the 
trial ju~ge. felt ·there .was ·no :prejudice to appellant here, 
. even ·Using hmdsig.ht. 
Respondents felt they had a right to inqui~ of this 
·adverse ·Witness the full. ba~is for' his opinion· that there 
~ . . . . 
.was no proxinrlty dainage to this property .. The trial court 
did not'illow responde~ts to' t~st his ere<tibility 'nor inij)each 
him and the respondents have _just eause_t<icomplal~ rather 
'th.an-:ap~riant: · · · ·· · -
The court: ~as OO~rect in: ~owing Harding ·to answer 
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if it were not ~~e that the adjacent property owner was 
paid a substantial sum a.S damages for proxi.mity of rthis 
highway. It would ·have been contrary to and at ·~ 
with the direct .testimony of ~thds adverse witness that there 
was no other severance· damage than the leaving of an ir-
regular back lot line. 
At least the ask·ing of the questions in an attempt to 
impeach or test an adverse witness cannot be error or pre-
judicial. One would be afraid to fight for the truth if the 
mere asking the question (even a controversial one) is S'Ufb-
jeet to recrimination. It was not asked to esta!blish value 
or a eomparaJble sale, but to show 1Jhat the witness, Har-
ding, knevv of or himself had allowed substantial proximity 
damages for property similarly ·situated The State of Utah 
was not even mentioned in the question. 
The cases cited ~by appellant under this point do not 
deal with cross-examination or where the questions are de-
signed to test credibility or impeach an adverse witn~ 
Most of the citations deal with cases where counsel ask 
questions before a jury when they know it to be improper 
or when they are acting in bad faith. Palace Laundry en 
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 63 Utah 201, 224 P. 657 says in 
a decision by Judge Frick: 
"It is next insisted that the judgment should be 
reversed for the misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in 
propounding a certain question to one of the defend-
ant's witnesses. If judgments were reversed because 
opposing counsel propound improper or useless ques-
·tions to 1hls adversary's witnesses, few, if any, judg-
ments could be permitted to stand." 
Held, such contention was without merit. This case has 
never been o~ed or modified in Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. State ex rei Highway Dep't 205 
Okla ... 325, 237 P. 2nd 878, 881: 
"The burden .is on the appellant to show that the 
error was prejudicial. Before such misconduct of coun-
sel can result in a reversal of the judgment, it must 
appear that substantial prejudice resulted therefrom 
and that the jury were influenced thereby, to the ma-
terial detriment of the party complaining." 
And, if the verdict was otherwise amply supported by com-
petent evidence, there was no substantial error. 
The Ritchie case cited by appellant, Weber County v. 
Ritchie, 98 U. 272, 96 P. 2nd 744, is not applicable to the 
case at bar for the reason that it involved an attempt 
to put on direct evidence of a price paid by a condemning 
authority but the price stated by the witness in·cluded un-
segregated damage amounts in addition to the value of the 
land such that it was inappropriate to show the comparable 
value of the land alone. 
The old rule concerning exclusion of sales to a con-
demning authority is as stated by appellant's brief. How-
ever, the new rationale and holdings of the more recent 
cases follow the dissent of Judge Carter. in the California 
case cited in ~ ppellant' s brief on pag:e 17 thereof, Cirty of 
Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal. 2nd 509, 170 P. 2nd 928, which 
case was overruled by County of Los Angeles v._ F~aus, 48 
Cal 2nd 672, 312 P. 2nd 680 (1957) and followed· by Co.-
Vina Hligh ~h~l Dist. of_ L. A. County v. Jobe, 174 Cal. 
2nd ·340 345 P. 2nd 78 (.1959) .. .'l'he ~aus case stands for 
' • "•·"' ·::.. ~ • ' •,· ; •~ •. • \ ' ' • • ·, > :• IJ ... 
the propositl.:on tpat in a condemnation proceeding,. evi-
den~ -~f priCes Pitid for sitjlilar · projierty in ·th~;: VicinitY, 
including prices Paid by cond~ei•; was adihissibl~ oh. di-
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rect examination and cross-examination.of witness who was 
presenting testimony on issue of value of condemnee's prop-
erty. The decision also states that in· overruling a line of 
contrary decisions that the former rule is no longer the rna~ 
jority rule and was contrary to logic, unrealistic and ob-
solete. However, the sale must be genuine, and the price 
must be actually paid or substantially secured. 
These recent cases follow the rationale of the Curley 
v. Mayor of Jersey City case, 83 NJL 760, 85 A. 197, 43 
LRA, NS 985, "in the absence of extraordinary' circum-
stan,ces, we are unable to see, as a general rule, why private 
sales to parties having the right to eondenm do not come 
quite as near representing in their results. true market value 
as do such sales made between parties neither of whom 
have this power." Most sales involve parties who are under 
pressure of one kind or another to either buy or sell for 
their own particular reasons. The fact of a sale being to 
a condemning authority is a "matter going to the weight 
or value of the evidence, not its admissibility." See Insti-
tute on Eminent Domain, 1961, Southwestern Legal Foun-
dation, Dallas, Texas, Pages 99-103, 110-111, which sets 
out the foregoing new legal development and also recites 
that cross-examination of an expert witness almost never 
is grounds for reversing a judgment from a lower cotut. 
The rule has always been that even where the rule 
prevails that comparable sales are not admissible on direct 
examination, that evidence of such sales may be brought 
out on cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting 
a Witness. State v. Peek, supra. Thus, cross-examination 
of condemnor's witnesses on what they had valued other 
lands was prope·r for the purpose of testing the accuracy 
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' 
and honesty of their valu~ti~ of the land in their ~t 
exaniliiation, City of San Luis: Obispo v. Brizzola~a 1. 100 
Cal. 434, 34-.P. 1083. Also, how much condemnor ha~. -paid 
for other lands _was not admissible as· evidence in chief, but 
only by vvay of cross-examination for the purpose of test-
ing the fairness or honesty of the opinion of the witness 
given upon his direct examination, Waterworks v. Drink-
house, 92 Oil. 532, 28 P. 681. 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RR Co. v. Southern 
Pacific RR Co., (1936) Cal. 57 P 2nd 575, held evidence of 
prices paid for other lands than those soughrt to be con-
demned was :prope·r on cross-examination of p].ajntiff's wit-
nesses in eminent domain proceedings. Palladine v. Im-
perial Valley Fann Lands Ass'n, 65 cal. App. 727, 225 P 
291, 303, ·held ·cross-e}{)amination on value of other lands 
is proper to test credibility and to impeach opffiions of wit-
nesses, but not for fixing the value of the land. In People 
v. Vinson, 99 Cal. 2nd 100, 221 P. 2nd 161, cross-examina-
tion of expert witness was allowed to test his knowledge, 
and to test the weights to be given to hds opinion and to 
impeach his opinion as to values stated by inquiring the 
prices whieh are asked or have been paid for other similar 
lands. 
The Covina High School District v. Jobe case, supra, 
held that the asking and answering of leading questions on 
cross-examination of expert witnesses regarding price paid 
by another school district in settlement pending condem-
nation litigation was not reversible error; that in condem-
nation proceedings wide latitude sh~d be allowed on cross-
exrulunation of e~rt witnesses .t~. t~t their reasons and 
valldity ~f ~their opinions as to value; that c~exarnina-
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t~o~, and by le~g questions, ~ school district's expert 
'vitnes3es on specific prices, values ·and am.OUlllts paid for 
ot:her parcels \vas permitted for the limited pmpose at test~ 
ing witnesseS and was not evidence of Inarket value. Th~ 
case also recites, ''Had the plaintiff 'been of the opinion that 
the asking of the question on cross-examination constituted 
error, it might have been well for ilt to have lnade a motion 
for a new trial which it did not do. We think there was 
no ·abuse of discretion.'' 
Our Utah Court has held iri ·Southern Pacific Co. v. 
- . . 
A·rthur, 10 Utah 2nd 306, 352 P. 2nd 693, t~t prices paid 
for similar property is admissible to shOW" value of prop-
erty taken in condemnation proceedings, and as showini 
- . 
source of knowledge upon which opinion evidence is based. 
In Weber Basin Water ConservancY District v. Ward, 10 
Utah 2nd 29, 347 P. 2nd ~~,·this court held the purpose 
of cross-examination was to test crediJbility and whatever 
may tend to explain, modify or contradict the direct evi-
dence; and that though trial judge has discretion to con-
trol cross-examination, he should not prevent inquiry into 
matters having direct bearing upon the vital issues of the 
case. 
In the case at bar, an attempt was being made to test 
the credibility of and impeach the opinion of appellant's 
expert witness Harding who said there was no proximity 
damage resulting from the construction of this highway. 
Respondents' witnesses had already established by their 
testimony their estimate of the market value, proximity 
damage and severance damage involved. Appellant wants 
a new trial now for even suggesting a conflict in the knowl-
edge or opinion of its expert witness on the groWl$ that 
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the QUestion alone ·. was misoonduct, bad· f.aith, prejudicial 
and embarrassing t<? appellant and said expert. Appellant 
and·, Mr. Harding sh?uld be embarrassed. i:r;t saying there 
was no proximity damage or substantial severance in this 
case. These damage values of proximity and severance 
of the property were the main issue of the case and it 
certainly cannot be error to attempt to cross-examine an 
adverse expert on this question and ms previous testimony. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO· RE-
CEIVE EVIDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE O·F 
UTAH, APPELLANT, RELATIN·G TO ZONING RESTRIC-
TIONS ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Counsel for appellant is incorrect in starting that the 
lower ~court refused evidence on zoning restrictions of the 
subject property. It is not pointed out where in the tran-
script that testimony was refused on pertinent ~oning reg-
ulations. As set out in respondents' brief under Additional 
Statement of Facts, we ·have set fioctJh with transcript ref-
erences that all the witnesses of both appellant and re-
spondents, consistently testified that at the time set for 
compensation, January 20, 1960, the condemned property 
\Vas zoned residential-agricultural which allowed for k~ 
ing sheep and that this was the highest and best . use · ~ 
the property. Appellant's expert witnesses, Hwding ~~ 
Stein, were specifically allowed by the court to .testify t~at 
the Christensen property could .l>e used for chicken ~aisi_rlg 
at the ijroe Said premises we~ -~qemn~ ('fr. 1.~~,'.2~())~·; 
and al~ that after said condepm.ation, the zoriffi.g O,rdirlan~ 
ces were changed (Tr. 175, 222)·~ Apparently appell~.t i~ 
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complaining that the lower court did refuse to allow_ said 
Harding and· Stein to testify that under the neW zondng or~ 
dinance continued sheep usage "was at best non-conform-
' . ' . 
ifrig" (Appellant's Brief, P. 25; but compare _with "opj~7 
tives" Tr. 176) .- · 
The trial of this case was had in March, 1961, approxi-
mately rthree months after appellant's witness, ·Stein, said 
the new zoning ordinance went into effect (Tr. 222) and 
about fifteen months after the property ·had been acquired 
by appellant under eminent domain. Respondent, Marion 
Christensen, correctly testified, without objection from ap-
pellant, and also under cross-examination, that the non-
usage of the property for chickens for two years prior to 
the time of trial made it impossible to raise chickens now 
imder the new ordinan,ce (Tr. 27, 45-46). Whether or not 
the new ordinance made sheep usage on said property "non-
eonforming" was immaterial on the question of darilages 
and the tri~al · court was quite correct in refusing to alloW 
appellant's witnesses to state in what way the zOning Or-
dinances have been changed or modified since the date set 
for fixing the amount of compensation (Tr. 175-176, 221-
222) . Besides,· Stein testified ·-.that he didn't even take into 
consideration the zoning ordinance ohange in his appraisal 
(Tr. 222) and Harding testified in his opinion- the praperty 
could be utilized for the same purpose after· the construc-
tion of the highway as· it was utilized for before said con-
demnation (Tr. 179). 
In other words, the _evidence is uncontroverted that 
the· · ~~demned premiseS. Could be used for· ni.ismg sheep 
or 'chickens at .the tiine of 'said condemnation. There sim-
ply is no issue_ regarding the zoning status of the property 
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arnd the'.OO\irt allOwed full ~osure of. the :und~ding 
of rthe witnesses regarding effects of zo.rrlng regUr~tioos on 
the m·arket value of ~the property as of Ja.111UarY 20, 1960, 
the time of the taking herein, ~d the only time which is 
pertinent ·to the affixing of damage values. 
·Apparently the only purpose of appellant in raising 
the point at all during the trial was an attempt to eonfuse 
the jtl!ry on 'the meaning of the term "non-conforming" 
with regard to eonrtinuing usage of the premises for sheep 
(Tr. 45-46, 73, 83, 111, 134) whereby on cross-examina-
tion (and in argument to the jury) appellant mised the 
question of sheep usage now as being "non-conforming" 
and if discontinued it ·could not be resumed. 
Or, perhaJps appellant designed for the respondents to 
take the ,money they coWd not obtam for rtlheir damages 
and rush out to buy several thousand chickens to put m 
their sheep shed buildings before the new restrictive zoning 
ordinance came into effect. Tile operation of 1Jhe respond-
ents w:as for raising sheep since 1947 and if the value of 
the improvements is destrowed for such usage, appellant 
cannot fo~ce :respondents to undertake a hazardous chicken 
operation merely to utilize existing facilities. However, 
the court allO\\fed appellant ·to put in this evidence allowing 
chicken usage by both its witnesses, Harding and Stein. 
How can appellant compladn on lack of evidence concern-
ing zoning? Sheep usage is admittedly permitted under 
the conditions existing Januacy 20, 1960, for residential-
agricultural zone or continuing thereaf,ter under a chang~ 
zone. The evidence on zoning was important only to show 
.what the expert appraisers for both litigants took into 
·consideration in evaluating the· damages compensable and 
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~~ '~, ~~ ~~t ~~to~ ·the ~gnt; ~ 
be ·given the ~ions by _ t~e. jury. -·- -· -_ . . _ : 
POINT IV- -~· 
.. 
JURY INSTRUCTlON NO._ 7 OF THE FO~TH DIS-
TRier COUR~ WAS- NOT. AN INCORR.ECr _STATE-
MENT OF THE LAW AND l)ID NOT- CONSTITUTE 
. . .. 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
~his la$ point raised by appellant seems to be an af.ter-
th()U.ght Qf counsel to find error in_ the ~record for the pur-
·pose of this appeal. Th~ issue_ concerning the alleged pre-
. judicial error of Instruction No. .7 was not even mentioned 
by appeHant for- grounds for relief in its Motion ·tor Re-. 
mittitur or its Motion.for New Trial (R. 76-79) nor in its 
Notice of Appeal setting forth the ''matters and points of 
- . - . . 
error'' (R. 87 -88). We. th~ .i.t should be ~arded on 
. ~ - . 
thJs·-gl-ound alone._ 
However, the objection to this instruction by State's 
- . -. . . . - -
A~mey Aldrich (R. 282) _ specifically o~jects to the sec-
ond paragraph rtJhereof relating to damages to respondents' 
_sheep opera~on. An~ ~er _ objection _ to ~ instruction 
is general and. is theref-ore n~~ en~tled _. ~o- consi?eration 
Di~ck_ v. U~ Fu~l Co., ~9 U. 430~ ~64 P. -~7,2,. holds that 
where an ex~on ls ~en to ~y a po~on of ~ in-
struction, the ~ on appeal . cannot consider compl~ 
~ other portions th~. An ~bjecmoo to an instruction 
which ~tes it is contrary to :the law and evidence of the 
case does not comply wirth the requirements ·of. R~e 51 of 
uiah Rules of Ci~il Procedure~ ~d since the· p~ of 
the ·rule is to bring ._to the attention. of the court specifiC 
errors to give_ an opportunity _to correct the ~e, rthe ob-
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jection should be specifiic enough to give the trial court 
notice of every error in the instruction, which is complained 
of on appeal. Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance Com-
pany v. Allen Oil Co., 123 U. 253, 258 P. 2nd 445, 450. 
Under these eases, objections for the first time in ap-
pellant's appeal brief are not well taken as to rthe second 
sentence of -said instruction involving cutting off access to 
a highway, vibrations, dust or obstructing of view. 
The theory of the appellant in this case, again, was 
that there was no interference with respondents' sheep op-
eration by the taking by the State of Utah of the pasture 
ground for a highway and leaving the buildings in an nn-
damaged condition. This instruction properly sets out the 
issue giving both theories of damage, namely, what are 
the. elements to be ~considered in fixing the damages, if any, 
to the remaining land of the defendant. These damages 
may include such items as the cutting of remaining land 
into irregular or ~inconvenient shapes such as was testified 
to by State's witnesses Harding and Stein. Or it may in-
clude ·cutting off access to a road (enjoyed by respondents 
with their sheep at the rear of the premises for 25 years) 
or noise, dust and attendant damages of the thruway tes-
tified to by respondents and the expert wimesses. Or it 
may includ~ as an element the use of the property for 
sheep operations as set forth by all the witnesses (if the 
usage of the remainder thereof was impaired by the tak-
ing). 
The cases cited by appellant's brief"oil page '27 there--
of stand fo:rl··the proposition that an instruction whicn .. ex-
' . . . . ... . . . ' ._, .--:' .. _ . : - . . . . . . . . ·. 
plffins the evidentiary value of some· facts to the· exclusion 
of oth~rs· 'funst1totes commentirtg ·():ri~·the evidence: b~{-·fue 
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court. Yet Instruction No. 7 is then complained· of .l10t 
that it cXeCludes any facts, but that it includ~ too- mu~h·~ 
It should be remembered that appellant's theory of the 
damageS Was that there \Vas DO ·_damage to the remaj.nder 
property from rthe items mentioned in the instruction ex-
cept for the first items set forth therein of cutting the land 
into irreguiar (Harding) or inconvenient (Stein) shapes. 
The instruction further provides in two places that the 
damage to the remaining land may be none by using the 
term .''if_ any'' in connection with the fixing of damages. 
Counsel is incorrect in. stating on P. 28 of appellant's 
brief that the construction of the public improvement did 
not limit or. restrict any access to the defendant's property, 
.' / ~ 
~vhi~h they· enjoyed prior to the taking. Respondents tes-
tified of the access they enjoyed, as did appellant's own 
witness, ·Harding, who had been in the real estate business 
in American· Fork for 16 years, that respondents have ta-
~en their sheep to their farm on the road south of the con-
demned property for as long as he could remember (Tr. 
21-26, 158~159, 166, 197). Respondents' testimony also re-
veals they eoilld not drive their sheep to their home prop-
erty now at all with the freeway built as it is and the city 
restrictions preventing such use of city streets north of 
the,. freeway. . 
C9un.se1 for appellant also errs in claiming damages 
~ere all~wed. by Instruction No. 7 for a business, loss of 
profits. or prospective damages to a business concern. The 
instruetion is clear that the items to be considered for dam-
agffi, if. 'any, Was th~ Us~· Of the land as a unit for sheep 
ffiising ·purposes and the lessened value of the reptainder 
as· a . site for the pwposes for which the land was being 
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usro. :No . eVIdence ot. damages to· profits o~. inc~~~ ;:~~s 
• \ : I ~ J ~·' ' ' ; • ' . , ' • .. • I i. • . I I • ; ( ' • 1. • 
received by· the court. An analysis of the value8_, on. dam-
. : ' ' .. \ ' ' . \ ' ' ~ ' ,. ~ . ·,; ... ' ~ ' ,· ' .· .~ 
ages (relating to the sheep operation) reVeals . tha~. the 
amountS were obtained by the respondents' e~rt witneS-
ses priricipally 'DY depreciating the · Costs · C1f · the lambing 
sheds and granary,. ;as totally useless for continued sheep 
operations and non-salvagable (See appr8.isal summary ref· 
erences in Additional Statement of Facts, supra) . Respond-
ents and their expert witnesses testified the property and 
buildings could no longer be used for sheep operations after 
the ·taking and appellant's ~witness Harding said it could-
that was the issue. 
State v. Noble, 6 U. 2nd 40, 305 P. 2nd 495, cited by 
appellant, deals with loss of future profits from sale Of sand 
and gravel deposits on land condemned and ~has no bear-
ing on this case question of severance damages to rthe re-
m.affiing tract. 
"The owner is not limited to recovery of the value of 
only that part of the tract which was physically appropri-
ated. The entire tract is considered as a whole and the 
effect of the condemnation and the projected use evaluated 
so thaJt determination can be :made of what he had prior 
to the proceeding and what he had lef1t thereafter." NiCh-
ols on Eminent Domain, Volume 4, P. 298, Sec. 14.1 (2). 
"Just compensation guaranteed by the constitution implies 
not merely the value of so much land separately from its 
connection wirth the whole tract, ·burt the injucy or loss to 
the whole estate caused by taking from it the part which 
i$ so appropriated." Ibid, P. 312, Sec. 14.21. See also 
-Pages 328 to 337, SeC. _14.231, 14.23.2 and 14.24. · ·"The size 
and ·shape in which the relnainder· of the pareel is left is 
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sometimes _such that the land cannot be put to its ·most 
advantageous ·Use~ · ·It is generally a~ that it may ~~ 
shoW:n to what· uses the prOperty might have been ~t prior 
to ·the> tillting ·and the Iuhited , uSe. t~ ~hich tlhe remaiitder 
• ~ ' ' t .. 
may he deVoted subsequently as a .. resUit of such taking. 
EVidence ·is admissible tnat the remainder area is no longer 
capable of use for a particular pu.rpose or that its facility 
therefor has been impaired." Ibid, Pages 352-354, Sec. 
14.243. "Such depreciation may result also from fu.e man-
ner in which the severance is effected, or from the fact 
that necessary or· desiiabl~ ·facilities are thffi.eby. rend~ 
inacCessible or difficUlt of convenient access.'' Ibid, Pages 
356-358, Sec. 14.243. 
AnYWay, an exception exists to the general rule against 
shqwing p:r_ufits from .use of landJ when the income or p.ro-
. ' . 
fits represent .. th~. proceec}s fro111: the sale of livestock ~ 
for and fed on the land in question, because the· i.n(xmle.is 
deriv~ from _the use of t1}1.e land and not as profits from a 
business ~d~ed thereon, ~ty Wld County. of Denv~ 
vs .. Qu~ck, 113 P. 2nd 999, 134 ALR. 1120. 
• I , ' .: • 
Any alleged improper words· in the instruction reklt-
ing to obstruction of view, odors or vibrations, etc.· were 
certainly not prejudicial because these points were not 
~stressed by either party (though there was some evidence 
on it) and were· not considered of much consequence. on 
the issue of damages. This wording on damages was -large-
ly incorporated frOm Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, VoL 4, Pages 
452-453. 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Prooodure, required thart 
if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the 
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jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact. This the lower \!ourt did in Instruction No. 13 (Tr. 
27~) and such instruction would remove any pre,judice that 
allegetny might flow from Instruction No. 7. 
CONCLUSION 
The dramatic language in ~ppellant's brief character-
izing the evidence and the "holocaust" of errors simply 
does not compare with the truth, if the transcript of the 
case is studied to see what really occurred during the trial. 
The evidence presented. by appellant was l.argely negative, 
but the jury verdict was based on the positive evidence of 
damages presented by respondents. Appellant ~has failed 
to show any prejudice or that the verdict was nort sustained 
by the evidence. As a matter of law, the trial court ·has 
sustained the verdict of the jury and the judgment. 
Respondents are elderly people deprived of their prop-
erty without recompense for nearly two years by appel-
lant. It would be manifestly unfair for them to have to 
submit to the expense and stress orf a new trial, now re-
quested by appellant, except for the most gross injustice 
to appellant resulting from the trial. Appellant never asked 
for relief from any such assumed gross injustice warrant-
i~g a mistrial or new jury panel. Most of the matter& here 
on appeal by appellant are routine and frivolous in the hop~ 
that a second trial would prove more favorable to the .con-
demning authority. A ~paratively small .. ~?illlt of 
money is involved and respondents are in danger of peing 
litigated to ruin. Appellant has the land .apd ~s~dents' 
money· th~r~fo~·, ·so that respo~cknts ·are un~bl~ to ·~pl~~ 
• : ·." . : • ; .. · !~ .. ·. ·. ··j·:L· i, 
what has.been taken. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
The jury verdict and judgment of the trial court be-
low should be affirmed in the interest of substantial jus-
tice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN AND PAYNE 
Attorneys for Respondents, 
Marion H. Christensen and 
Rintha G. Christensen, his wife 
128 East Center tSreet 
Provo, Utah 
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